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Applying to the Present
Failure to offer a clear elucidation of goals and objectives
Failure to achieve agreement internally as to what was intended
Failure to demonstrate readiness to absorb costs for sanctions imposition
Failure to anticipate and manage resistance
Identification and exploitation of a core target vulnerability
Use of incrementalism for signaling and resolve purposes
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Though many commentators have suggested that the Trump administration’s approach with 
respect to sanctions threats against Europe is “unprecedented,” the relative comity in US-
European sanctions policy making in recent years may be the aberration. The United States 
and Europe have often disagreed about whether, when, and how to impose sanctions against 
even common adversaries and in order to resolve mutually recognized problems. One of the 
most serious examples of this occurred in 1982, when the United States and its European 
allies broke sharply over the US decision to impose sanctions on the Soviet Union over the 
crackdown on the Solidarity Movement in Poland. The crisis that emerged tested the NATO 
Alliance, European governments, and the Reagan administration.
This paper reviews the 1982 example and then sets some lessons from it against the current US-
European relationship. It offers an assessment not only of the changing political, economic, and 
social factors that have contributed to greater compliance with US sanctions dictates on the 
part of Europe over the last few years, but also the relatively brittle nature of this cooperation. 
It underscores that, though the United States may be in a relatively predominant economic 
position at present, this situation may not and likely will not persist indefinitely.
From this perspective, it concludes with three recommendations for how to modify current US 
sanctions practice in order to help manage partner concerns and avoid future crises.
 ● Adopting a process more akin to the Federal Register notice procedure for new 
sanctions programs. There is a yawning need for more consultation in advance of 
US sanctions decisions that could have major market moving and alliance shaking 
potential. It is not necessary, nor would it be prudent, to have a process that required 
public scrutiny of individual or entity asset freeze scenarios, but for other, more broad 
sanctions initiatives, it would help to avoid unintended consequences and ensure a 
more comprehensive debate. Exceptions could also be made to this rule in the event of 
a legitimate emergency. 
 ● Establishing an independent commission to evaluate US sanctions policies and 
challenges. Congress should set up an independent, bipartisan commission to 
examine the issue of US sanctions policy now and for the next twenty-five years. Its 
assignment would be to evaluate how sanctions have been used in the recent past, 
the international operating environment for sanctions now, and the dimensions of the 
sanctions policy challenge in the future.
 ● Improving congressional oversight of the sanctions process. Congress should also 
require evaluation reports for individual sanctions regimes as a standard part of 
the executive branch’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA). Of course, similar requirements ought to be considered a standard part of 
congressionally mandated sanctions as well.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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The Trump administration’s decision to break with the European Union over Iran and the 
reimposition of sanctions has been rightly treated as a mistake. However, some have taken their 
criticism of the Trump administration too far, suggesting that this is a break without precedent 
in US-European affairs. In fact, with respect to sanctions policy, the level of cooperation enjoyed 
by the United States and Europe in confronting Iran, North Korea, and Russia—to name a few—
may be the anomaly. Over the past half century, there are myriad examples of the United States 
and Europe diverging in their views of the nature of a foreign policy problem and the use of 
sanctions to correct it. From Iran, Libya, and Cuba in the mid-1990s to Myanmar, Zimbabwe, 
and Iran today, the United States and Europe often do not agree on how sanctions can best be 
employed or whether their application will help or hurt a situation.
One particular incident stands out, however, insofar as it involved a difference in view between 
the United States and Europe on a commonly held threat—the Soviet Union—and the best 
means of confronting it after its support for intensified repression in Poland. In the early 
1980s, the Reagan Administration took aim at West European energy imports from the Soviet 
Union and, both through diplomacy and eventually through sanctions, sought to persuade 
Western Europe to discontinue its investments and purchases. The effort failed. Though some 
readers may have participated in these events, the incident itself has largely slipped the minds 
of many of those who are interested in energy, in sanctions, or in US-European affairs. But it 
has important resonance today in all three areas, not least due to the persistent interest in 
the United States to police European energy security and the simmering resentment such 
endeavors breed in Europe.
This paper will first outline the relevant historical facts around the early 1980s sanctions 
episode, identifying a few key themes and conclusions. It will then consider these themes 
and conclusions against the current US-Europe issues of Iran and Russia sanctions in order 
to identify important parallels as well as differences between the cases and their historical 
settings. It will then offer recommendations on how to approach the use of sanctions in the 
future to prevent or at least better manage such confrontations.
Europe and the United States share far more in common than in opposition. From security 
policy to economic relationships, the transatlantic bond has enabled both sides to reap 
tremendous benefits. In fact, the very fundamental nature of the relationship may have 
inspired some on both sides of the Atlantic to take it for granted. By identifying our history 
of disagreement and the means by which we overcame our differences—and, in some ways, 
failed to do so—we can better learn how to tend and maintain this relationship in the future.
INTRODUCTION
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On December 13, 1981, Poland’s Communist leaders declared martial law in a bid to restore 
order in the midst of ongoing protests led by Solidarity, the Polish labor union. This was not 
entirely unanticipated. Over the previous year, Solidarity had led protests and strikes aimed 
at reforms of the Polish system, built on a foundation of common resentment and frustration 
with the corruption and inefficiencies of the Polish Communist Party and government. 
Solidarity was also very large, with “nine million members, out of an electorate of twenty-six 
million.”1 For Poland’s government, Solidarity represented a potent threat, not least because—
in an alleged worker’s paradise—it appeared to have substantially more support of the Polish 
laborer than the Communist Party.
Recognizing that the Soviet Union might view Solidarity as a threat to the cohesion of the 
Warsaw Pact and mindful of past interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United 
States and its NATO allies sought to deter Soviet intervention into Poland. They issued 
a communiqué on December 12, 1980, that warned, “any intervention [in Poland] would 
fundamentally alter the entire situation. The Allies would be compelled to react in the 
manner which the gravity of this development would require.”2 NATO also began to prepare 
a contingency plan for its response, centered on the use of “strong, coordinated economic 
sanctions, including halts to exports of grain, [Western Bloc] technology, and oil and gas 
equipment.”3 However, there was no coordinated approach for a Soviet intervention that “fell 
short of invasion, or in case of internal repression…”4
Consequently, when Poland declared martial law and began arresting Solidarity leaders in the 
absence of an overt Soviet role, there was initial confusion and—ultimately—disagreement 
within NATO about whether and how to react to the Soviet Union in particular. Some within 
NATO believed that it was imperative to impose real costs on the Soviets in addition to the 
Poles; others did not see a need to impose costs on the Soviet Union itself, arguing that “they 
needed more time to evaluate the situation in Poland and determine appropriate responses.”5
Within the Reagan administration, a debate emerged that pitted those who believed that 
alliance cohesion was paramount and others who saw the Polish crisis as an opportunity to 
impose real costs on the Soviet Union. Perhaps not surprisingly, the State Department under 
Secretary Alexander Haig led the first group while the Defense Department under Secretary 
Caspar Weinberger led the second. Importantly, there was little disagreement about the need 
to respond to the situation in Poland or the righteousness of confronting the Soviet Union; 
instead, the disagreement centered on the means and level of acceptable disruption to the 
NATO alliance.6
This is an important distinction because, though NATO remained fully engaged in its mission 
of deterring Soviet aggression and being prepared to fight a war in Europe if need be, there 
were important differences within the alliance as to how to manage relations with the Soviet 
Union. A US Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) from 1982 captures the cleavages 
between NATO allies directly, noting that “it will be difficult to enlist Allied cooperation 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
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in restricting trade with the USSR. Beyond the economic incentives, there are political 
considerations which fuel the West Europeans’ reluctance to accept restrictions on trade and 
credits to the USSR.”7 For some in Europe, there was a prevailing interest in détente with the 
Soviets, which trade could potentially facilitate. Others were concerned about maintaining 
access to Eastern Europe. But, in sum, the absence of an overt Soviet role in the Polish crisis 
made it difficult for the United States to convince its partners in Europe that these prevailing 
interests ought to be set aside in furtherance of a more coercive approach to the USSR.
European-Soviet trade was relatively modest by the early 1980s in most categories, as could 
be expected by the terms of the Cold War.8 European trade with the United States, Canada, 
and even Africa was larger than with the Soviet Union. That said, one notable exception lay in 
energy and, in particular, natural gas. After the 1970s energy crisis, several European countries 
had prioritized investing in natural gas as a means of lessening its dependence on oil from 
the Middle East while others sought other means of electrification, such as nuclear power in 
France.9 Geography and availability pushed Europe to seek gas from the Soviet Union, and by 
the late 1970s, Europe was importing over twenty-five billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from 
the Soviet Union. (Of course, some purchases of Soviet natural gas predated the oil crisis, 
but it remained an inflection point for increased investment in this area.) At the same time, 
Europe was also exporting billions of dollars’ worth of natural gas extraction and pipeline-
related equipment to the Soviet Union, a substantial portion of which used US proprietary 
technology.10 The primary objective of this trade was intended to support the construction of 
a new pipeline that would go from the Urengoy Siberian gas field through Ukraine and thence 
throughout Western Europe. Natural gas development and export, therefore, was of value 
not only insofar as the gas itself was concerned, but also as a source of European exports, 
employment, and support for détente with the Soviets.
At the same time, within the United States, the idea of confronting the Soviet Union was 
generally ascendant. This same SNIE articulates well the logic behind confrontation. It outlined 
the manner in which the Soviets were beholden to trade with the West for hard currency 
as well as technology. It suggests that a strategy of technology denial and trade limitation 
could put pressure on the Soviet Union and hinder its ability to develop and field new military 
hardware.11 Moreover, advocates for a tougher approach to Moscow were also concerned in 
particular about the perceived, growing dependence of Europe on Russian natural gas for 
their economic well-being. They feared that this would provide leverage to the Soviets in a 
future crisis, perhaps contributing to fractures in the alliance.12 They pointed to estimates that 
European imports of Soviet gas would go from approximately 25.5 bcm in 1980 to nearly 54 
bcm by 1988, should the Urengoy pipeline be completed.13 Such imports would constitute 
approximately 30 percent of the natural gas used by Germany, France, Italy, and Spain for a 
total of 5 to 6 percent of the total energy consumed in Western Europe.14 For those convinced 
that the Soviet Union’s intent was to divide and subjugate Western Europe, this threat was 
too significant to ignore. Of course, they also saw an opportunity, with the Soviet Union 
experiencing “increasingly pronounced economic difficulties that seemed endemic to its 
system,”15 to put real pressure on the Soviet Union. At a minimum, “the Reagan Administration 
reasoned that the West should do nothing to help the USSR out of its dire economic straits.”16
The United States and its European partners met shortly after the Polish crackdown to 
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establish a common approach on both Poland and the Soviet Union. With respect to Poland, 
sanctions imposition largely targeted ongoing streams of economic aid, particularly those that 
would have otherwise gone directly to the Polish government. Instead, both prioritized aid for 
the Polish people via private mechanisms.
With respect to the Soviet Union, however, the United States and Europe were on very different 
pages from the start. The United States sought support for a robust sanctions approach while 
European partners suggested more patience to suss out the Soviet role.17 
In the meantime, however, the Reagan administration met internally and decided that it  
would undertake a series of unilateral sanctions. These were announced on December 29  
and included:
 ● suspension of Aeroflot flights to the United States;
 ● closure of the Soviet Purchasing Commission;
 ● suspension of licenses for all high technology exports, including for oil and gas 
equipment;
 ● expansion of the list of oil and gas equipment requiring export licenses;
 ● suspension of negotiations on a new long-term grain agreement; 
 ● suspension on negotiations on a new US-Soviet maritime agreement; and 
 ● allowance of technical exchange agreements to lapse (energy and space in May, 
science and technology in July).18 
Secretary Haig, while announcing the sanctions, also stated that these constituted an “interim 
step that hardly exhausts the list of potential actions.”19 
These sanctions came as a surprise to the Europeans, reportedly with only five hours’ 
warning, but it was hardly a complete one given the conversations held the days and weeks 
after the crackdown. Most troubling for Europe was the inclusion of sanctions prohibiting 
high technology export licenses. As noted previously, a substantial element of the pipeline 
construction depended on the provision of US-origin technology, especially turbines and 
compressors. A prohibition on the supply of these goods would sharply delay the construction 
of the pipeline and consequent provision of gas.
Herein a major question loomed: Would the United States apply these sanctions retroactively, 
covering licenses already issued and business deals already made or prospectively? The State 
and Commerce Departments argued in favor of a prospective approach, at least insofar as 
non-US firms were concerned, so that the sanctions would be focused on future trade and 
construction agreements. In deference to their concerns, Reagan held off on a retrospective, 
extraterritorial approach until after consultations with Europe could be held. Thus enabled, 
Secretary Haig and his staff sought to convince European governments to adopt sanctions 
of their own and to at least respect US sanctions on pipeline-related equipment for future 
deals. State believed that European commitments to undertake a combination of these 
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steps—particularly with the addition of a commitment to “refrain from undercutting American 
sanctions” with new contracts—constituted a “solid success.”20 Buttressing these steps, the 
European Community adopted a resolution on March 15, 1982, that reduced imports by 25 
percent for some goods and 50 percent for others, involving approximately sixty products in 
total. The effect would be to reduce imports from the Soviet Union by about $150 million.21
But overall, the Reagan administration was not satisfied with the severity of sanctions adopted. 
It wanted to secure more stringent measures, including the suspension of ongoing negotiations 
over trade agreements with the Soviet Union and restrictions on Soviet access to credit.
By virtue of its stagnant economy, the Soviet Union was considerably dependent on credit 
to finance imports. The Reagan administration sought to increase the interest rate on Soviet 
credit, which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was 
able to do by May 1982. State Department officials explicitly used the possibility of applying 
the gas pipeline sanctions retrospectively to secure European concessions on this front, 
anticipating that obtaining a higher credit rate in exchange for agreeing to forgo retrospective 
sanctions on the pipeline this would constitute an acceptable outcome for US hardliners. 
In particular, they negotiated with the French government—which sought US intervention 
in currency markets to bolster the franc—and agreed that, with the pipeline issue set aside, 
France would push for restrictions on Soviet credit and the United States would support 
French monetary policy.22
Unfortunately for the State Department, “Defense and the NSC remained adamantly opposed 
to the pipeline and refused to endorse any deal.”23 Reagan prevaricated during talks with the 
Europeans and, either in earnest ignorance of the many-layered negotiations that the State 
Department was undertaking or out of a desire to jettison an agreement that he found to 
be insufficient, subsequently refused to honor the agreement reached on the French franc.24  
French President Mitterand responded by holding a press conference acknowledging that 
France had taken all the steps that it would take to impose economic costs on the Soviet 
Union. In turn, the United States announced on June 18 that it would be extending its pipeline 
sanctions to include foreign subsidiaries of US companies and anyone else operating under a 
US export license.25
Predictably, Europe was aghast at this decision. Reactions ranged from the stoic West German 
statement that “the pipeline will be built” to the more emotive French foreign minister’s 
description of the situation as a “progressive divorce,” with the United States and Europe “no 
longer speak[ing] the same language.”26 He also suggested that “this day, June 18, 1982, could 
well go down as the beginning of the end of the Atlantic Alliance…the United States has just 
declared what amounts to economic warfare on her allies in Western Europe.”27 Making things 
worse, the United States had announced less than two weeks prior that “it would levy stiff 
penalties on steel imports from the European Economic Community to offset government 
subsidies that permitted the European countries to sell the steel in the United States below 
cost, in the view of the Commerce Department”28 and refused to apply its own embargo of 
exports of grain to the Soviet Union in conjunction with the pipeline sanctions. This last point 
was especially galling to European interlocutors, who demanded that the United States be 
prepared to exact similar costs on its own economy as those being sought from Europe. 
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Reagan, having campaigned against the Carter-era grain embargo (which was established 
in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979), refused to countenance sanctions 
that would be seen as breaking a campaign promise. Moreover, he argued that the embargo 
was “not having the desired effect of seriously penalizing the USSR for its brutal invasion and 
occupation of Afghanistan…” in part because of undercutting by non-American suppliers.29  
Even if true, the sum total of these steps was to create an impression in Europe that the 
United States was hypocritically defending its own economic interests while demanding 
Europeans make sacrifices. Moreover, the extraterritorial nature of the sanctions—enacted by 
Washington but enforced on European firms—grated, especially since there was a perception 
of the United States using its licensing authority selectively to advance its own economic 
interests. Reagan’s request in 1981 to the Japanese government that its firm, Komatsu, refrain 
from completing a contract to sell pipelayers to the Soviet Union seemed to serve as a case in 
point: ten days after Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki agreed, the Commerce Department gave 
Caterpillar, Komatsu’s direct competitor, a license to proceed with the same export.30
Notwithstanding their frustration, European companies began to move to comply with the 
US demands. The Reagan administration likely believed that, though European governments 
may complain, they would not persist in their defiance of the United States, especially since 
the sanctions targeted firms rather than countries. As Drezner notes, “The coercion of firms 
is usually easier than the coercion of nation-states. CEOs do not care about relative gains or 
political reputation; they care about profits.”31 Moreover, the absence of concrete steps by 
the Europeans to combat US sanctions throughout June and July may have suggested to 
Reagan administration officials that European resistance was crumbling. More likely, European 
officials probably believed that they would be able to dissuade the United States from taking 
its reckless course of action or damaging their interests with the United States in other areas if 
they kept the dispute largely rhetorical and behind closed doors.
At the end of July, however, British Prime Minister Thatcher opened the door to more direct 
defiance of the United States by stating in the House of Commons that “it is wrong” for “one 
very powerful nation [to] prevent existing contracts being fulfilled.”32 Other leaders soon 
echoed her comments in what Martin called “negative bandwagoning,” “in which European 
governments followed one another in formally ordering their firms to ignore the American 
sanctions.”33 In addition to decrying the legal principles upon which the sanctions were 
imposed, the Europeans argued that the Soviets would be able to construct the pipeline 
in any event and further incentivized to develop their own technology to the detriment of 
Western firms. The result was that Europe went farther than admonishing their firms to ignore 
the US sanctions imposed and instead took direct steps to ensure that they would fulfill the 
terms of their contracts. At the end of August, the French took the extraordinary step of 
threatening “to requisition [Dresser-France] facilities and carry out the order anyway.”34 Other 
European firms likewise fulfilled their contracts.
The United States swiftly imposed sanctions on all of the offenders, banning them from 
commerce with the United States. But, solidarity within the United States was fleeting. Both 
within the Reagan Administration and between the executive and legislative branches, the 
dispute was highly polarizing. The imposition of sanctions against those European firms, after 
all, did not just apply to their ability to conduct business in the United States, it also affected 
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US firms and their bottom lines. Members of Congress began to mull legislation to reverse the 
imposition of sanctions and to require that any such measures be “contingent on approval and 
joint action from the allies.”35 This, in turn, sent Europeans a signal that their resistance to US 
sanctions was bearing fruit inside of Washington. Studies conducted by the State Department 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency suggested first that these measures would hurt Western 
exports more than Soviet imports as “newly industrialized countries (NIC) could make up 
most of the shortfall”36 and, second, that “imports of technology were so important to the 
Soviets that they would inevitably find ways to overcome hard currency constraints.”37
By November 13, the Reagan administration had had enough. The president announced that 
he would drop both the original sanctions on supply of goods for gas pipelines as well as their 
expansive interpretation from June. Though Reagan stated in the radio address announcing 
the decision that “the understanding we and our partners have reached and the actions we 
are taking reflect our mutual determination to overcome differences and strengthen our 
cohesion,”38 both the British and French foreign ministers were clear in their corresponding 
statements that this was a unilateral decision on the part of the United States rather than as 
a result of any negotiation.39 Moreover, European firms continued to do business with the 
Soviets, signing contracts worth $1.5 billion in the six months after the incident40; instead of 
slowing down the Soviet Union, “US firms encountered greater difficulties trying to export 
to European companies fearful of a future embargo [and] foreign direct investment in the 
European Community also became a sensitive issue.”41
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Rather than serve as an example for how the United States can use its economic might and 
superior control over technology, the pipeline sanctions episode should serve as a cautionary 
tale for those overly enamored with US unilateral action. The United States endeavored to 
exert its will over its foreign partners by virtue of their companies’ economic interests and 
found that European governments were not only able to but also willing to resist aggressively. 
Presently, there appears to be both less political will to confront the United States on the part 
of European governments (at least in any meaningful, nonrhetorical sense) and continued 
deference to its preferences by European economic actors. This suggests that the United 
States has been able to overcome whatever restraints exist to its freedom of action with 
respect to sanctions imposition. 
In this section, we’ll consider six main points that should be taken from this episode. In the 
next, we’ll test those lessons against modern sanctions cases to establish whether things have, 
indeed, changed or whether limitations on US sanctions policy still exist, if in different form. 
This section will also include consideration as to what factors may have changed the balance 
of power between Europe and the United States.
To begin, the pipeline episode showed the difficulty of getting sanctions to work when 
the process used to design them is flawed and incoherent. Put another way, this sanctions 
program failed multiple steps in the design process I articulated in The Art of Sanctions, and 
its performance shows some of the dangers in doing so. Key elements include:
 ● Failure to offer a clear elucidation of goals and objectives. The Reagan administration 
said that its objective was to punish the Soviet Union for its involvement in the Polish 
crackdown. But it did not articulate a vision for how imposing sanctions would further 
prevent such crackdowns or remediate the existing one. Logically, one could infer 
from the use of sanctions that the Reagan administration thought the Soviets would 
back down from their involvement and persuade the Polish government to ease its 
crackdown. But the Reagan administration talked about the use of sanctions mainly 
insofar as the imposition of punishment rather than to change Soviet or Polish behavior. 
 
In fact, key members of the Reagan administration thought that the pipeline was a 
problem well before the events of December 1981. These officials believed that Europe 
was opening itself to coercion from Moscow on a fundamental level with respect to a 
vital national industry. From this perspective, it would appear—and did so to some in 
Europe—that the United States was merely using the Poland episode as an excuse to 
do something it had already decided was essential. 
 
The absence of corroborative evidence to prove that the Polish crackdown was 
ordered by Moscow helped to create further disagreement with Europe. European 
partners did not agree that the Soviets were behind the decision or that they were 
responsible for its execution. Consequently, from their perspective, sanctions against 
LEARNING FROM THE PAST
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the Soviets suffered a legitimacy crisis that made it that much harder to build a 
consolidated sanctions coalition. This undermined the use of sanctions.
 ● Failure to achieve agreement internally as to what was intended. Simply put, the Reagan 
administration itself did not agree on its end goals or the appropriate instrument to 
obtain them, and was therefore unable to convince members of Congress—let alone 
foreign partners—as to the imperatives driving US policy or the utility in doing so. 
European officials saw the United States as aiming at the pipeline solely, while US 
officials believed that they were helping to establish the kind of pressure mechanism 
that might improve US and Allied ability to triumph in the Cold War. Some measure of 
internal disagreement is always going to emerge in policy making, given the different 
priorities and interests held by various members of a team. However, the pipeline 
sanctions episode demonstrated a serious lack of internal cohesion from start to finish. 
The result was that the Europeans were able to first target individual parts of the 
administration and, eventually, members of Congress for appeals intended to fracture 
support for and implementation of the sanctions.
 ● Failure to demonstrate readiness to absorb costs for sanctions imposition. 
Notwithstanding its broader readiness to confront the Soviets, the Reagan 
administration was unwilling to absorb pain itself for the imposition of sanctions against 
the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration refused to consider reimposing the grain 
embargo, which many in Europe expected would at least be on the table if they were to 
go forward with pipeline sanctions. This struck Europe—as it often does now—as if the 
United States had alternative reasons for the policies it pursued, not least its own self-
serving economic needs. This undermined alliance cohesion as well as signaled that it 
would be possible for the Europeans themselves to inflict punishment on Washington 
that the administration would find it hard to handle.
 ● Failure to anticipate and manage resistance. The Reagan administration’s approach to 
sanctions expected that European companies would respect their larger interest in the 
United States and desist from business that would compromise this access. And, to 
some extent, the Reagan administration was quite right to do so. The initial corporate 
response to US sanctions threats was to back down, agreeing not to supply the 
contracted goods in deference to US sanctions prerogatives. This is not, in and of itself, 
surprising, given the different interests and risk tolerances that exist between companies 
and governments.  
 
But the Reagan administration failed to recognize that European resistance to US 
sanctions would exceed the tolerances of their companies. It did not appreciate the 
degree to which other differences of view on the Soviet Union and even unrelated issues 
(such as exchange rate management for France or steel tariff policy) would determine 
the trajectory of European resistance to US sanctions. Consequently, the Reagan 
administration was backed into a corner, forced to sanction European companies that 
were of value to the United States and creating the firestorm of political pressure that 
led to Congress preparing to reverse the sanctions. 
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What’s worse is that the Reagan administration failed to recognize that European 
partners would feed on one another’s confidence and resistance, leading to the kind of 
bandwagoning behavior that made it even harder for European partners to back down 
than the United States. Indeed, instead of picking off one or two countries that might 
otherwise have been more willing to comply with the United States than others, the US 
frontal assault on Europe inspired pushback that was mutually reinforcing. 
Complaints notwithstanding, the use of sanctions against Moscow did pass a few of the tests for 
sanctions design that I would apply.
 ● Identification and exploitation of a core target vulnerability. As the US SNIE made 
clear, the acquisition of hard currency was a key priority for the Soviet Union at the 
time. Its comparative export advantage lay in the field of energy production, and the 
pipeline would have been a key element of the Soviet strategy to generate income. 
Moreover, the Soviets used their technology import activities to flesh out their own 
technical capacities and fill their shortcomings. From this perspective, closing off 
Soviet access to technology and another source of export earnings would create 
hardship for Moscow and, consequently, was a reasonable target for pressure. 
 
That said, this was a vulnerability that the Soviets understood as well as which they 
were working hard to close. The fact that the Soviets were assessed as being able to 
develop and field their own technology, and to be able to scavenge from other projects 
in order to complete the offending one on their own, meant that this vulnerability was 
less significant than the Reagan administration thought. Moreover, it undermined the 
case made to the Europeans that these sanctions would put a permanent crimp in 
Moscow’s plans. Instead, European officials were able to convincingly argue—with US 
intelligence community backing—that the Soviets would be able to finish their work 
regardless. This sapped some of the significance behind the sanctions and undermined 
the case at home. (In retrospect, it may also have encouraged the Russians to seek 
their own technological solutions to the challenges they faced.) 
 
The result was that, even had the Soviets been in a position to reverse course in Poland 
(a debatable point, at least), the type of sanctions pressure applied by the United 
States was unsustainable along any time horizon necessary to make it functional. The 
Soviets were in a position to simply endure US sanctions.
 ● Use of incrementalism for signaling and resolve purposes. The Reagan administration 
did—if inadvertently and as a result of internal compromises—create a stepwise 
approach for the imposition of sanctions against the Soviet Union. First curtailing US 
companies’ access to the Soviet pipeline project and then eventually including foreign 
subsidiaries and partners created an escalation ladder that the Soviets—had they 
been in a position to manage the Polish crackdown—could have potentially avoided. 
Moreover, by consistently threatening to expand the scope of the US sanctions, the 
United States engaged in the kind of signaling behavior to Europe that ought to have 
avoided strategic surprise when the United States decided to act. 
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However, the Reagan administration also undercut its success in this regard by sending 
very mixed signals as to what would constitute an acceptable set of Soviet-focused 
sanctions for Europe to take. The fact that agreements were apparently reached with 
the Europeans—or, at a minimum, perceived to have been reached—and then discarded 
only further reinforced the message confusion that, in the end, probably contributed to 
the European refusal to cooperate and to resist actively.
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Given that some of these problems are particular to the modalities of applying sanctions 
in the Soviet case and that it took place over thirty-five years ago, it is reasonable to ask 
whether these lessons have any bearing on US sanctions policy today. Fortuitously, the US 
application of sanctions has—if anything—increased over the past thirty-five years, such that 
we have a wealth of examples to examine. 
Failure to offer a clear elucidation of goals and objectives
Since the Soviet pipeline experience, there have been sanctions programs in which the US 
aim is well established and definitively stated. Sanctions against Iraq in 1990, for example, 
were motivated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and intended to coerce Saddam to withdraw from 
the country, while in the meantime, an international coalition was assembled to ensure this 
objective could also be achieved by force. Likewise, sanctions imposed against those who 
have undermined democratic governance (e.g., in Western Africa), tested nuclear weapons 
(i.e., India, Pakistan, and North Korea), and supported the use of terrorism (e.g., all State 
Sponsors of Terrorism and the disparate terrorist groups that have formed in the last thirty 
five years) have all been announced with some degree of explanation as to their purpose.
However, the US sanctions endeavor remains plagued by two interlocking problems:
1. Ambiguity as to what would merit relief
2. Mission creep
On the first, the United States has continued to fail to outline as part of sanctions imposition 
the constellation of actions that the sanctioned party could undertake in order to acquire 
sanctions relief. Or, at any rate, the United States has yet to consistently provide this 
information with any specificity so as to offer practical guidance for those sanctions targets. 
The practical result has been unpredictability in sanctions enforcement and the creation of 
mixed messages. 
India and Pakistan, for example, were sanctioned for their testing of nuclear weapons in 1998 
but almost as swiftly relieved of those sanctions, either because of the strategic necessity 
of cooperation (as with Pakistan post-9/11) or because of the strategic opportunity for 
engagement (as with India). North Korea, by contrast, has been subjected to increasing 
sanctions punishment due to its nuclear weapons developments and tests, with no clear signal 
that relief may be in sight. Of course, there are differences in the threat presented to the 
United States from these three nuclear arsenals, with the North Koreans being aimed explicitly 
at US allies and perhaps the US homeland. There are also distinctions in the US relationship 
with the countries, not least that the United States and North Korea remain technically at 
war. Still, all three nuclear weapons programs have generated some margin of instability in 
their respective regions and, arguably, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs 
have the greatest chance of contributing to a nuclear exchange than any other current 
APPLYING TO THE PRESENT
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nuclear weapons programs today given the perpetually simmering border confrontation 
between the two countries. It may also be possible that some degree of realism is present 
in the US decision to target North Korea and not India or Pakistan, as the former’s nuclear 
weapons ambitions were still nascent when sanctions were first imposed, while the latter had 
established substantial nuclear weapons programs when testing them in 1998. But from purely 
a sanctions perspective, this is no great comfort when it comes to the necessity of outlining 
a clear rationale for sanctions imposition or the rationale for eventual relief; to the contrary, 
it would seem to corroborate the long-held proposition that US sanctions policy is primarily 
dictated by their use against whoever is either weaker or more consistently crosswise of the 
United States rather than more principled positions of policy and adherence to international 
law. The degree to which US sanctions also target Iran, its nuclear weapons advances having 
been suspended voluntarily since 2003–2004 (a fact known since December 2007), also 
contribute to the sense that US sanctions policy is opportunistic and bullying, rather than 
principled and consistent.
This relates directly to issues of mission creep. Though sanctions are sometimes imposed 
for discrete reasons, over time, there are incentives for expanding their application as 
additional problems emerge with their targets and powerful disincentives to relieve sanctions, 
particularly against targets with which one has a strong adversarial relationship. New reasons 
to keep sanctions in place and perhaps even to expand their application are found, with 
the consequence being that sanctions may never actually be released. Moreover, given 
the credibility issues that are sometimes cited with sanctions relief (such as the idea that 
adversaries will believe their sanctioning opponents to be weak if they agree to release 
sanctions), there are often also domestic political reasons why—in the United States in 
particular—sanctions have a tendency to stick around.
Failure to achieve agreement internally as to what was intended 
So long as government administrations are run by human beings, it will likely prove impossible 
to avoid internal disagreements on whether and how to impose sanctions, just as is the case 
with any other policy instrument. (In fact, it is arguably far better to have these sorts of 
disagreements, which can sort out whether and how to use such instruments, than to seek 
their elimination.) In this, while sanctions imposition against the Soviet Union was no doubt 
undermined by internal splits, the Reagan administration was neither the first nor the last 
administration to have to deal with the ramifications of the split. 
Two other dimensions of the Reagan-era internal turmoil, however, are more important and 
merit examination:
1. The degree to which Reagan policy makers believed that the United States was 
capable of driving international policy by fiat
2. Lack of harmonization with Congress
On the first, the historical record is strongly suggestive that some officials in the US 
government believed that, regardless of their own views on the subject, US allies would be 
forced to comply with US dictates if backed with economic force. Their perspective was 
buttressed by an understanding of the traditional US leadership role in confronting the Soviet 
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Union, particularly in Europe, and the relative weight of the US economy versus that of the 
Soviet Union. Their view was, in essence, that the United States could make decisions for other 
sovereign nations and that, grudgingly perhaps, those countries would be forced to follow 
where the United States led.
Of course, the historical record also demonstrates that these officials were wrong. But it is not 
evident that the United States has learned much from this experience, in that it persists as a 
substantial element of US sanctions policy, especially since the late 1990s, when “secondary 
sanctions” entered their vogue. Such sanctions are unique in that they seek to deny foreign 
companies from doing business with other foreign companies, regardless of the degree 
to which there is US involvement in the transaction or even illicit conduct. Though foreign 
governments in 1982 perceived US sanctions as an unacceptably extraterritorial application 
of US law, the reality is that denial of US-origin goods from being transferred to a designated 
adversary is a fairly routine element of export controls and one that all countries with national 
export control regimes possess. What was controversial and different in 1982 was the degree 
to which the United States was exercising its national prerogatives after contracts were signed 
and transfers were authorized, and threatening foreign companies with punishment to boot. 
By contrast, what the United States has done since the mid-1990s is far more aggressive: 
seeking to transform international foreign policy through domestic economic leverage.
That this effort has been deemed successful only deepens the degree to which US officials 
have come to internalize the notion that such a state of affairs is not only normal, but also 
tacitly accepted by the rest of the international community. Though some officials may still 
argue that foreign partner buy-in is an essential element for success (and, in my experience, 
both the Bush and the Obama administrations made concerted efforts to obtain such 
cooperation), the unilateralist streak in US sanctions policy is evident both in the range of 
sanctions bills on offer at any particular moment in time and the degree to which it is now 
commonly expected that the US president can coerce foreign cooperation against foreign 
will. In fact, in this way, the executive branch and Congress have become far more likeminded 
in their consideration of sanctions, in that politicians of both parties have encouraged and 
endorsed exactly this treatment of US sanctions efforts over the last few decades.
Of course, it is worth considering whether those supporting this kind of approach to sanctions 
have a point. After all, it is a separate matter whether there are risks and costs to this 
approach; the initial question is whether the United States can, in fact, determine the foreign 
policy of its allies through sanctions fiat.
If we look mainly at sanctions cases, they present a mixed bag. Since the early 1980s, dozens 
of sanctions regimes have been installed or dismantled. But in most cases, the United 
States and its allies (European ones, in particular) were largely on the same page, or their 
disagreements were sufficiently narrow so as to avoid a major blowup. Sanctions regimes 
as diverse as those against Burma/Myanmar, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Guatemala, The Gambia, 
Niger, the Ivory Coast, North Korea, Libya, and Iran were developed and executed as part of a 
collaborative effort.42 The range of sanctions targets meant that there were varying degrees of 
economic interest and concern among the participants in the imposition of sanctions, any of 
which could have potentially imperiled the effort. But after the normal diplomatic to-ing and 
fro-ing, they were resolved. 
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But looking at the final outcome of the sanctions push leaves us unclear whether cooperation 
or coercion achieved the results in question, particularly since there were elements of both 
along the way. Pre-2011 Libya is a useful case in point. As I developed further in my paper43  
on the subject from 2018, the United States was well out in front of Europe when it came to 
the application of sanctions against Libya. The reasons for this were myriad, including the 
imperative of obtaining access to Libyan oil. But a result of this separation was considerable 
friction on Libya sanctions until the Libyans crossed major European redlines through their 
terror attacks on civil aviation. Yet even when commonly held problems are identified, 
disputes over the means can still develop, as was certainly the case with Iran in 1996, when 
the United States imposed sanctions that would have affected European business with Iran 
contrary to European government wishes.
In this context, it is worth recalling Hufbauer, Elliott, and Schott’s work on the subject of 
international cooperation in sanctions implementation. They concluded that, given their 
analysis of the litany of sanctions cases after the Second World War, “sanctions should be 
either deployed unilaterally, because the need for one’s allies is slight, or designed in genuine 
cooperation with one’s allies in order to reduce backlash and evasion.”44 They noted further 
that “pressing too hard to corral reluctant allies can have the perverse effect of undermining 
the impact of the sanctions, if multilateral agreement takes too long to achieve or requires 
watering down the sanctions imposed.”45 Put another way, if a likeminded coalition does 
not already exist prior to a decision to impose sanctions, it may be difficult to obtain such 
cooperation through sanctions threats, and the resulting conflict can undermine the chances 
of success. This, it is clear, is what happened in part during the Soviet case and which may yet 
occur with respect to Iran under the Trump administration.
Failure to demonstrate readiness to absorb costs for sanctions imposition
Of course, one way that countries can avoid splits is if there is a shared burden. Hufbauer, 
Elliott, and Schott quoted nineteenth century Prussian strategist Von Moltke as saying of 
coalitions “as soon as one of the allies has to make sacrifices for the attainment of a large 
common objective, one cannot usually count on the coalition’s efficacy.”46 This is particularly 
true if one side of a coalition is perceived to be paying more for victory than another.
But of the major sanctions cases of the last twenty years, it appears as if something has 
changed in this fairly sensible assessment of human nature, particularly as relates to the 
United States. If we look to those sanctions episodes that have driven UN Security Council 
debates or been considered as necessary elements of avoiding war, we actually have several 
in which the economic burden to be imposed was not on the country cheerleading the most 
for sanctions—the United States. From Russia to Iran to North Korea to Myanmar, the United 
States has been active in pushing for sanctions that would minimally affect its economy but 
disproportionally affect those of our partners or allies. This is particularly pronounced with 
respect to Iran and Russia, where the United States has minimal trade relations and yet very 
aggressive sanctions either in place or on the table.
By itself, this is not a surprising phenomenon and is rather logical: it is far easier to advocate 
sanctions solutions when one’s companies and citizens are unlikely to be affected.
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What is strange is the degree to which, notwithstanding this asymmetry of interests, the 
United States has been successful in securing such sanctions measures. The 1982 case shows 
clearly that European allies held the refusal of the United States to impose a grain embargo 
on the Soviet Union as indicative of its weak will in sanctions enforcement and, worse, its 
unwillingness to share the costs of coercion. Consistent with this, one argument that the 
United States frequently used during my time in government was that though it was true 
that US trade with Iran, for example, was marginal and there was little to cut, this reflected 
a previous sanctions decision on our part. Put another way, the United States was able to 
argue that it had already undertaken its own sanctions-led cutoff in trade ties and that while 
the timing of the action was different, the United States had in fact absorbed similar costs. 
The need to balance the burden was actually for Europe and others, not for the United 
States. But in practice, this was received as a tepid, unconvincing argument, in part because 
those receiving it were facing an imminent demand to cut off business while those doing 
the demanding had long since moved on. Certainly, it was true that the United States was 
inoculated against charges of hypocrisy, which was helpful, but probably not decisive in 
securing significant concessions by US partners.
That said, it is important to note that the entire concept of burden sharing is far from 
obsolete. In fact, in many of our interactions with foreign governments when advocating on 
behalf of sanctions—whether against Iran, Russia, North Korea, or others—a major source 
of frustration was not the absence of burden sharing by the United States but that of other 
countries. Notably, many governments were interested not only in whether other countries 
would be undertaking the same cuts, restrictions, or impediments in their normal trade, but 
also whether the United States would treat those who refused to comply with US demands 
equally. In this, the imperative of burden sharing somewhat shifted from a situation in which 
countries wanted to see the United States absorb its share of the costs and to one in which 
the United States was entreated to serve as an objective and impartial referee. This likely 
speaks to the next issue, the degree to which the United States is in more of a position today 
than in 1982 to anticipate and manage resistance to its sanctions drives and, if it is, why.
Failure to anticipate and manage resistance
Simply put, the Reagan administration did not expect as much resistance as it received 
to its sanctions initiative and was ill equipped to respond to concerted pushback from its 
European allies. The consequence was that the United States was forced to back down in the 
confrontation. Similar patterns can be seen in other cases, such as the 1996–1997 incidents 
with respect to Cuba and Iran (and, to a lesser extent, Libya). In those cases, the United States 
met with resistance and then was forced to calibrate its approach.
Similar concerns motivated US sanctions officials from 2000 through 2010, where there was 
a willingness to push Europe and other allies, but an awareness that there may be limits to 
how far US leverage may take us. Even one of the great successes in the use of US sanctions 
pressure—the threatened access to the US financial system if countries refused to reduce their 
purchases of Iranian oil—occurred at the same time as the European Union voted on its own 
measure to halt the purchase of Iranian oil altogether. Consequently, though the United States 
was able to claim European oil reductions as an element of success for the sanctions strategy, 
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the responsibility for the action was perceived to be a European initiative contemporaneous 
with an American one. In fact, a careful review of the history underscores that then–French 
President Sarkozy was discussing an oil cut-off three weeks before US sanctions legislation 
was passed. A similar story of cooperation, perhaps with some coercion from Washington 
playing a role, exists with respect to a raft of other sanctions cases, including those against 
North Korea and Russia.
The Trump administration, by its own admission, is prepared to entertain cooperation with 
countries but is not conditioning its policy decisions on that cooperation. Instead, US officials 
have talked cavalierly about sanctioning European companies with some frequency, up to and 
including the President in an August 7, 2018, tweet in which he said, “The Iran sanctions have 
officially been cast. These are the most biting sanctions ever imposed, and in November they 
ratchet up to yet another level. Anyone doing business with Iran will NOT be doing business 
with the United States. I am asking for WORLD PEACE, nothing less!”
Setting aside the Trump administration’s contributions to world peace, if past practice 
served as precedent, then logically one would anticipate a robust retaliatory approach by 
the European Union. In fact, the coincidence of a broader trade battle—over steel tariffs, 
no less—in both scenarios would argue strongly in favor of at least a similar approach. But 
aside from theoretically blocking its companies from complying with US sanctions against 
Iran, the European Union and its leaders have largely stuck to rhetorical jousting with the 
United States. They have condemned US policy but done little to demonstrate that the 
United States would bear a cost for its enforcement of it. This is a circumstance not limited 
only to Iran policy. With respect to Russia, for example, European officials have expressed 
their opposition to US unilateral sanctions that would target Nordstream-2, Russian energy 
exploration and extraction, and Russia’s financial sector on the whole. Their confrontation 
with the United States has been muted by the Trump administration’s own reluctance to pair 
rhetoric with action against Russia, but the result has been a marked absence of reluctance 
on the part of the US Congress to significantly dial back its sanctions pressure against 
Russia. Face-saving words about cooperation and consultation may obscure the extent of 
US congressional rejection of European concerns, but this rejection remains evident in new 
legislation being considered now by Congress (such as the Defending American Security from 
Kremlin Aggression [DASKA] Act of 2019), which would—among other things—establish a US 
sanctions regime on Russian oil production that is similar to that against Iran, which prompted 
a major US-Europe confrontation in 1996.
It is possible that European reticence to take on the United States now is attributable to the 
character of its leaders and those of the United States’. In 1982, for example, the United States 
was led by Ronald Reagan who, despite being a firm Cold Warrior, also attempted to maintain 
a positive relationship with Europe. In 2018, we have Donald Trump, whose views on European 
leadership are decidedly less warm. In 1982, we had Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, 
and Helmut Schmidt as leaders in the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany; of them, 
Schmidt’s political future was the most questionable at the time, and he would soon be 
replaced by Helmut Kohl. By contrast, in 2018, the United States faces Theresa May as the 
prime minister of the UK, facing the Herculean tasks of managing BREXIT while preserving 
her political coalition; Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose last victory in German elections was 
TRANSATLANTIC SANCTIONS POLICY: FROM THE 1982 SOVIET GAS PIPELINE EPISODE TO TODAY
24 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
the weakest of her tenure; and Emmanuel Macron as the president of France, who is probably 
the most popular of the lot but still facing a variety of internal challenges in France and within 
the EU. But if anything, the rise of populism in Europe would generally argue in favor of a less 
deferential approach to US policy than one which is more conciliatory. Moreover, Trump is 
himself deeply unpopular in Europe, with a 23 percent approval rating as of January 2018.47  
Arguably, it would also be in the political interest of many European leaders to distinguish 
themselves from the United States, particularly on a policy issue like sanctions and their 
extraterritorial effects. Moreover, attributing the difference to pure personality differences 
obscures the degree to which the United States strong-armed its partners into tougher 
sanctions on Iran from 2008 to 2011.
Consequently, though politics and personalities may play a role, a far more likely reason 
for the absence of concerted resistance lies in more fundamental interests. Trump’s own 
willingness to walk away from NATO and take more extreme actions that would threaten 
European security could be one such interest that is perceived at risk. At a time when Europe 
does face legitimate security threats, not least being terrorism and a potentially revanchist 
Russia, European officials may be unwilling to challenge the United States to the extent 
possible (which, in conversations held with European officials in May 2018, would appear to 
be a significant factor). Similar considerations are likely behind Japan’s and South Korea’s 
readiness to join the US sanctions campaign against Iran again in 2018, and their reluctance 
to challenge threatening rhetoric from the United States in overt fashion; their interests 
in maintaining good US ties, particularly in managing the threat of North Korea and the 
challenge of China, may be paramount.
But a more likely element is the degree to which the United States is simply more able to 
damage key elements of foreign economies in the absence of cooperation than it used to.
If we compare the situations in 1982 and 2018, particularly with respect to France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (the three countries that opposed US sanctions against the Soviet 
Union’s pipeline most vociferously and the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of 
sanctions against Iran), a few things jump out.
First, while the United States and Europe remain close trading partners, the relationship 
has gotten relatively less important for the United States and more so for the Europeans. 
Chart 1 demonstrates that though US imports from Europe have remained largely static as a 
percentage of its total imports, exports to Europe have fallen off, relative to the rest of the 
world. Chart 2 shows this with respect to France and Germany, in particular. Though there is 
considerable variation year to year over the thirty-seven years’ worth of data captured, the 
overall trajectory is reasonably clear.
TRANSATLANTIC SANCTIONS POLICY: FROM THE 1982 SOVIET GAS PIPELINE EPISODE TO TODAY
ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | MARCH 2019  | 25
Figure 1: Share of Europe in overall US trade in goods, 1980–2017  
Source: Haver Trade Data
Figure 2: European-US trade in goods as a share of respective GDP, 1980–2017
Source: Haver Trade Data
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For the United Kingdom, trade in goods actually fell off during the period measured, 
suggesting that it should be somewhat less dependent on business with the United States.
But, when investment—both by Europeans in the United States and Americans in Europe—is 
factored in, the degree of European vulnerability to US pressure can be seen more distinctly, 
particularly for Europe.
Starting with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the United States, the overall picture is of a 
significant increase in FDI generally over the last twenty years, but relatively static levels for 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Chart 3).
Figure 3: FDI in the United States on a historical-cost basis, 1980–2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
In fact, when examined as a percentage of overall US FDI inflows, the three European 
countries show relative similar levels from 1980 to 2017 (chart 4). Or, put another way, though 
the overall amount in 2017 was only 27 percent of the total US FDI inflow that year, this is 
relatively similar to the 35 percent of 1982.
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Figure 4: European share of total US FDI inflows, 1980–2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
But in absolute terms, the amount of investment by those three European countries in the 
United States has gone up considerably. For the United Kingdom, for example, the British 
Office of National Statistics has reported that “[the United States] specifically accounts for 
around one-third of the total from 2014 to 2016.”48 For France and Germany, the percentage is 
less (roughly 19 percent for each49); still, the amounts in question are considerable, particularly 
given the recent economic difficulties in Europe after the 2008 Great Recession and in the 
United Kingdom over BREXIT.
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Figure 5: French, German, and British FDI in the United States, 1980–2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
By contrast, the US direct investment position in each of these three countries is markedly 
less than in the past.* On a global perspective, US direct investment in these countries has 
been largely static when viewed in comparison to the rest of the world (chart 6). Moreover, as 
a share of overall US investment abroad, these three countries have fallen precipitously from 
nearly 30 percent of US investment in to barely 15 percent in 2017 (chart 7).
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Figure 6: US direct investment abroad on a historical-cost basis, 1989–2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Figure 7: Percent of total US direct investment abroad on a historical-cost basis, 1989–2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
*Data from before 1989 were unavailable from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, but the overall trend is 
demonstrated regardless.
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Moreover, the disproportionate value of US investment in the United Kingdom (shown in chart 
8) tilts the overall percentage. With the United Kingdom removed, the total US direct invest-
ment in France and Germany combined has fallen from over 10 percent in 1989 to just over 3 
percent in 2017.50
Figure 8: US Direct Investment in France, Germany, and the UK, 1989–2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Taken in combination, the picture is one of relative European dependence on retaining access 
to the United States and relative US indifference to the same, at least in pure economic terms. 
Were the United States to cut off Europe—or, at least, these three European economies—from 
its markets, they would suffer comparatively more in terms of lost goods and investment than 
the United States would. The United States could risk its services trade surplus with the EU—
$54.8 billion in 2016, up 0.8 percent from 201551—but, under current US law, these are less in 
the crosshairs of US sanctioners than goods, investment, or financial flows. It would probably 
take a European decision to target these activities to put them at considerable risk, a step 
that, to date, Europe has been ill disposed to take. This, in part, underlies the contention by 
those advocating US withdrawal from the JCPOA as well as a host of other aggressive US 
sanctions steps that it would be foolish for other countries to put at risk their abilities to 
conduct business with a nearly $20 trillion economy in order to do business with $400 billion 
or similar-sized economies.
But, as I have written about elsewhere, this is an interpretation that both minimizes the 
contribution of foreign business activity for US prosperity and overstates the ability of the 
United States to utilize its economy for leverage without cost.
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On the former, US businesses do receive substantial benefits from their abilities to invest 
abroad and from their abilities to receive investment form abroad. Roughly 2–3 percent of US 
GDP is derived from FDI, and US investment abroad generates billions in income. But, taken in 
aggregate, US sanctions and trade policy have targeted over 75 percent of the sources of FDI 
(shown in blue hues below) since Donald Trump was elected president and countries in which 
67 percent of US direct investment has been made.
Figure 9: US FDI by region, 2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Figure 10: US direct investment by region, 2017  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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To date, their governments have sought solutions to the trade and sanctions disputes with 
the United States, and to selectively apply retaliatory tariffs after formal notification to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). But this need not be the sum total of their response, nor is 
it necessarily likely to remain such, particularly if US sanctions start to undermine the ability of 
these countries to pursue their own independent economic policies. Some European officials 
have already begun to speculate about the possibility of developing alternative financial mod-
els to avoid involving the US financial system, joining Russian and Chinese officials who have 
encouraged the same for years. Though we are unlikely to witness a sensational reduction in 
foreign investment in the United States or in permitting US direct investment abroad in the 
near term, given the size of the US economy, this does not mean that policy changes abroad 
might not be taken to reduce vulnerability to US sanctions. Taken in the context of a broad-
er change in global economic conditions and the end of the US economic unipolar moment 
of the 1990s, it is possible that this sort of approach to policy making could contribute to a 
reordering of trade and investment priorities and even to a reduction in the global role of the 
dollar. To the latter point, since 1999, the share of the US dollar in global currency reserves has 
fallen from 71 percent to 62 percent (chart 11), and this before the United States began over-
leveraging its economic position in pursuit of America First.
Figure 11: World foreign exchange reserves, 1Q 1999–1Q 2018  
Source: International Monetary Fund
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But, even here, there are certain factors that still contribute to tremendous US advantage. The 
centrality of New York and the dollar to trade flows, for example, will still accord to the United 
States substantial influence and gravity in affecting global economic activity that can and 
will be used for sanctions purposes, even if only latently. Moreover, even if we assume a more 
bullish role for non-US dollar reserve currencies, the absence of any reasonable, near-term 
competitor suggests an outsized role still for the United States. In fact, as a member of the 
European Central Bank’s Executive Board, Benoit Coeure, noted in a February 15, 2019, speech 
to the Council on Foreign Relations, “while the euro is the second most used currency by most 
measures, it often lags behind the dollar by a wide margin.”52
Simply put, for the moment, the United States has the edge on its allies and partners, and 
therefore, its ability to manage resistance, because that resistance is more brittle than thirty-
five years prior. As a consequence, this has fundamentally reshaped the degree to which that 
resistance is meaningful.
Identification and exploitation of a core target vulnerability
As with the US ability to manage resistance, the US ability to target sanctions on core 
vulnerabilities has improved markedly since 1982. This is a development that occurred on a 
less-than-linear trajectory, given the far more comprehensive approach taken to sanctions 
against Iraq in 1990–2003. But in the new “targeted sanctions” era, the United States and its 
partners have become very agile and nuanced in their application of sanctions. The Russia 
sanctions of 2014–2018, for example, have been characterized as “microtargeted” sanctions 
in that they did not even seek to impose pressure on entire sectors of the Russian economy 
or entire operations of individual companies. Instead, the United States and Europe targeted 
specific elements of business—debt, finance, and technological transfer—in a bid to apply 
pressure in ways that would not affect entire markets or create unintended consequences. 
Similar approaches have been seen in other sanctions regimes.
To some extent, this improved approach reflects tactical changes on the part of sanctioners, 
not least a desire to avoid some of the collateral damage witnessed in the Iraq case. But it 
also reflects two other factors: first, the increasingly complex and global nature of business, 
which opens itself to disruption in manifold ways, and second, the degree to which the United 
States and its partners sit at the intersection of these patterns of trade, in nodes that can be 
compressed or released with greater control than perhaps in the past. The high concentration 
of finance, for example, in New York has even created a situation in which the local banking 
regulator has become known as a tough enforcer of international sanctions, affecting business 
decisions as a result. The same can be said of the pools of finance in which most banks 
operate: one reason why the European Investment Bank (EIB) refused to do business in 
Iran after the US May 2018 decision to withdraw from the JCPOA is that, though the EIB is a 
European institution, 30 percent of its outstanding debt is denominated in dollars, which the 
United States could have targeted with sanctions.53
Consequently, both because of better targeting and more discrete vulnerabilities, the US 
performance in sanctions enforcement has substantially improved over the last few decades. 
That said, there are still incidents that demonstrate that ideology and conviction can 
TRANSATLANTIC SANCTIONS POLICY: FROM THE 1982 SOVIET GAS PIPELINE EPISODE TO TODAY
34 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
sometimes swamp facts. The decision to impose sanctions on Iran’s import of gasoline in 
2010, for example, was reasonable as a first step into the oil and gas sector, but it was billed 
as something that might have a “silver bullet” effect. Similarly, threats of sanctions against 
North Korean banking have taken on a magical aura, with advocates implying that this one 
step—which probably would require imposing significant sanctions on large Chinese financial 
institutions—will resolve the situation altogether. For this reason, though targeting has gotten 
more precise and effective, it is still imperative for sanctioners to restrain their optimistic 
projections of success until facts bear them out. To fail to do so is to risk sanctions being seen 
as having failed, when their realistic chances of success may have been marginal from the start.
Use of incrementalism for signaling and resolve purposes
Likewise, though there has been some research that suggests incremental approaches 
more frequently fail than the overwhelming use of sanctions, the prevailing US approach 
to sanctions from 1982 through 2018 has been to favor an incremental approach in which 
credibility is built over time and leverage expended via negotiations. What’s less clear is 
that the United States has become any more proficient about assigning objectives for the 
introduction of pressure, as was outlined at length above, or in assessing when patience and 
prudence have run their course.
North Korean sanctions from the late Bush administration through until the last year of the 
Obama administration and Russia sanctions from 2015 to 2017 are examples where the United 
States has taken a far more reserved and cautious posture than incrementalism would itself 
require. In each of these cases, the United States has exercised patience (indeed, the North 
Korea effort was called Strategic Patience) in its application of sanctions, prioritizing other 
instruments and direct diplomatic activity in order to seek desired outcomes. The results 
were far less than optimal, with the North Koreans advancing in their development of both 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and the Russians finding new ways of inoculating their 
economy from Western sanctions.
More than anything, however, this underscores a deeper, significant point about the use of 
sanctions and pressure: the imperative of embedding the tools into a coherent, organized, and 
methodical strategy. Absent this connection, patience becomes first a crutch for inaction and 
eventually a justification to avoid action that might otherwise rile a situation. The benefit is 
avoiding reckless action, to be sure, but with the consequence of potentially turning patience 
to lethargy.
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Overall, since 1982, there have been crucial developments that affect the future of US sanctions 
policy. The first, irreducible fact is that, at least for the moment, the extent of globalization and 
US dominance in key nodes makes it far harder for those in opposition to push back against 
the United States. This is hardly news, as it has been a part of US strategic calculus since the 
early 2000s, as Juan Zarate points out in his book Treasury’s War.54 But it is still a conclusion for 
which there is often considerable doubt. Though some believed after the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed upon in July 2015 that the ability for the United States 
to snap back the application of sanctions against Iran would be muted by the sanctions relief 
that Iran would enjoy under the agreement, the Obama administration and JCPOA supporters 
argued—it would appear correctly—that no such risk existed due to US economic dominance. 
And, in fact, when the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, though some argued that the 
United States would never be able to reconstitute sanctions pressure against Iran or that the 
multilateral nature of the agreement rendered such pressure moot, the ability of the United 
States to wreak havoc via sanctions has been reaffirmed in developments in Iran’s economy.
All of this suggests that, for the time being, the United States has materially changed the 
balance of global economic power, less because of macroeconomic factors such as GDP, 
growth, or employment, but more because at fundamental levels, allied economic health is 
dependent on a good relationship with the United States.
But herein also lies the problem for the United States: European leaders especially are well 
aware of their captive status and have begun mulling options for reducing their vulnerability 
and risk, as indeed any target of sanctions usually does. More than anything, this may be 
the sharpest insight of the 1982 sanctions campaign insofar as its applicability to today: by 
making Europe and other US partners the targets of sanctions, the United States has created 
common cause between its allies and its adversaries in defeating US sanctions. 
The question, now, is what will happen as a result.
In 1982, the United States quickly ascertained that it was going to be on the losing side of 
the argument, due to both foreign and domestic pressure. Consequently, the United States 
backed down and, to a large extent, avoided creating pressure on systemic fixes to prevent 
future US adventurism. Likewise, in the mid-1990s, the United States adjusted to partner 
frustration with sanctions over Cuba and Iran. Europe mulled taking action, including a suit 
at the World Trade Organization that would have complicated US sanctions’ imposition for 
future scenarios if it had been found in breach of its obligations. But in the end, there was no 
such suit, and the blocking statute passed against compliance with US sanctions by European 
companies largely went unheeded.
Today, a combination of policy decisions and general stance make it more likely than not that 
the confrontation between the United States and its partners around the world on trade and 
sanctions will persist, even in the face of resistance. As I concluded in an article with former 
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew recently, the Trump administration’s conviction that it can force the 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
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rest of the world to bow to its prerogatives is potentially self-defeating in the long run, even if it 
results in short-term wins, such as the increased pressure on Iran’s economy through sanctions. 
This is particularly the case given the chaotic nature of current policy making and the degree 
to which decisions taken in one area—for example, trade and tariffs—conflict violently with 
objectives in other areas (such as, for example, in seeking solutions to other foreign policy topics).
Beyond addressing these fundamental problems of statecraft—requiring, as Lew and I 
concluded, a refreshed commitment to multilateralism, reluctance to use coercive instruments 
until after diplomacy has been tried, and a willingness to assess policy trade-offs—there are 
other steps the United States can and should pursue in short order to more adequately apply 
the lessons of 1982 and avoid future problems. These should include the following:
 ● Adopting a process more akin to the Federal Register notice procedure for new 
sanctions programs. As I suggested in 201555 and other former US officials have 
likewise noted,56 there is a yawning need for more consultation in advance of US 
sanctions decisions that could have major market moving and alliance shaking 
potential. It is not necessary nor would it be prudent to have a process that required 
public scrutiny of individual or entity asset freeze scenarios, but for other, more 
broad sanctions initiatives, it would help to avoid unintended consequences and 
ensure a more comprehensive debate. Exceptions could also be made to this rule in 
the event of a legitimate emergency, but such exceptions could also be limited by an 
automatic expiration of the authority within six months unless endorsed by Congress 
or subjected to the same postaction review process.
 ● Establishing an independent commission to evaluate US sanctions policies and 
challenges. Though Congress can sometimes be the source of US sanctions overuse, 
it also remains the most effective debating chamber for US policy and a place in 
which policy can be scrutinized in the open. Congress should set up an independent, 
bipartisan commission to examine the issue of US sanctions policy now and for the 
next twenty-five years. Its assignment would be to evaluate how sanctions have been 
used in the recent past, the international operating environment for sanctions now, 
and the dimensions of the sanctions policy challenge in the future. The commission 
should be empowered to submit to Congress and the president recommendations for 
structural, procedural, and legal reforms for sanctions policy in order to streamline its 
execution and permit serious reflection of its results. It should also identify ways in 
which international countermeasures could be adopted to undermine US sanctions 
policy and to recommend options for addressing them.
 ● Improving congressional oversight of the sanctions process. Congress should also 
require evaluation reports for individual sanctions regimes as a standard part of the 
executive branch’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); 
such sanctions have to be renewed annually anyway, and a short, substantive report 
on implementation can and should be part of the associated submission to Congress. 
Congress can use other organizations, like the Congressional Research Service or 
Government Accountability Office, to issue companion evaluation reports. Of course, 
similar requirements ought to be considered a standard part of congressionally 
mandated sanctions as well.
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